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12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 156

REASONABLE ROYALTIES AND THE CALCULATION OF
PATENT DAMAGES:
Reflections and Recommendations for a Fair and Adequate Calculating Basis of
Reasonable Royalties in Terms of Harmonization of China-Taiwan Regional
Patent Laws
Chung-Lun Shen*
Introduction
Recently, Taiwan has been working with China toward the harmonization of
intellectual property laws in the Cross-Straits Region. This collaboration may be considered a
significant part of Asian regional integration on intellectual property policies and will play an
active role in the development of a post-TRIPS era in the future.1 In 2010, “the Cross-Straits
Intellectual Property Rights Protection Agreement” was concluded and came into effect.2 The
Cross-Straits-Agreement represents a great step for Taiwan and China toward mutual
cooperation on the aspects of acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement of intellectual
property rights. Its provisions address, for example, mutual recognition of priority of earlierfiled applications for patents, trademarks, and plant varieties 3 ; mutual cooperation in the
prosecution of patent and plant variety rights4; the certification of copyrighted works5; the
establishment of a coordinated mechanism for the resolution of specific issues over on-line
piracy; and, the protection of famous marks and geographic indicators6. The Cross-Straits
Agreement should lead to the harmonization of substantive issues under intellectual property
laws in the future.
Among the substantive issues of patent law, patent enforcement has received
increasing focus in the global community.7 Owing to the intangibility of patents, and in view
of the symmetry of exclusive rights with damages, courts and juries have difficulty
calculating appropriate damages for patent infringement. 8 Compared with the traditional
calculation of patent damages, which rests upon the patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits,
the basis of reasonable royalties provides a flexible concept for accommodating damages
when the patentee cannot adequately prove damages, especially, when the patented or
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter the TRIPS Agreement].
2
See the Cross-Straits Intellectual Property Protection Agreement (the original text in Chinese), June 29, 2010
available at http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/News_NewsContent.aspx?NewsID=4578 (last updated July 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Cross-Straits Agreement].
3
See id. art. I.
4
See id. arts. III-IV.
5
See id. art. VI.
6
See id. art. VII.
7
See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 977-79 (2011)
(notwithstanding a limited meaning toward patent law, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is
accounting for the international focus upon strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights.)
8
See infra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.

infringing products were not available in the market at the time of infringement.9 Until the
amendment of Taiwan’s Patent Act in 2011, the authority of reasonable royalties as patent
damages was not officially codified. 10 China’s Patent Act had recognized the remedy of
patent infringement subject to reasonable royalties since 2000.11 In light of the development
of comparative patent laws and original jurisprudence guiding patent law, the provisions of
Taiwan’s Patent Act and China’s Patent Act concerning reasonable royalties as patent
damages still have room for refinement. Consequently, this article attempts to establish an
optimal model for applying related provisions in future judicial practice. The proposed model
could contribute a common guideline for the determination of reasonable royalties to the
regional harmonization of patent laws in Taiwan and China.
I. The Legal Structure of Patent Damages under Taiwanese and Chinese Patent Laws
A. Calculation of Patent Damages under Taiwan’s Patent Act
1. The Position of Patent Damages under Traditional Damages Law
Patent damages have been among the most controversial issues of patent law in the
global community. Although Paragraph 1 of Article 85 under the current Taiwanese Patent
Act addresses patent damages exclusively, this section will review and clarify this provision,
in view of academic arguments and practical development.
a. Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 85 of the Current Taiwanese Patent Act
First, Paragraph 1 of Article 216 of the Taiwanese Civil Code limits damages for
injury to property to the harm suffered by the property and the loss of economic interests
enjoyed by the owners.12 Instead of a legal model in which civil law parallels commercial law,
the Taiwanese legal system adopted the concept of “convergence”. This concept considers
civil law a series of fundamental stipulations and allows commercial law its own series of
special stipulations, provided that no similar or overlapping provisions exist under civil and
commercial laws. 13 The traditional interpretation of the civil legal system recognizes that
Paragraph 1 of Article 216 of the Taiwanese Civil Code established the scope of damages as
a fundamental stipulation. When Paragraph 1 of Article 85 of the current Taiwanese Patent
Act was enacted, the civil law and patent law damages provisions collided and fractured the
traditional interpretation. One interpretation adhered to the traditional argument, positioning
the provision of patent law as a damage calculation subject to the scope of damages under
civil law.14 Another interpretation prioritized patent law over civil law, recognizing a special
scope of damages because patents are different from traditional tangible properties.15

9

See infra Part II-4.
See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text
12
Paragraph 1, Taiwan Civil Code art. 216 (2002) (“Except as otherwise stipulated in this or other Acts, or
contracts, the damages ought to be limited to the compensation to any damage or loss borne by the oblige”)
(translated by this author).
13
See TEZ-CHIEN WANG (王澤鑑), THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF CIVIL CODE (民法總則) 18-19, (2d ed. 2008).
14
See Chung-Lun Shen (沈宗倫), Adequate Interpretation and Reconstruction of Causation of Patent Damage,
8, no.1 TECH. L. REV (科技法學評論)12-13 (June 2011) (hereinafter Causation of Patent Damage).
15
See Chung-Hsin Hsu(許忠信), Examining the Compensation Liability for Patent Infringement in Taiwan from
the Perspective of German Law, 61 TAIPEI U. L. REV 13 (臺北大學法學論叢) (March 2007).
10

Second, even though the damage calculation provision of Taiwan’s Patent Act is
subject to the damage scope of Taiwan’s Civil Code, there are four approaches the patentee
could choose from to calculate damages when patent infringement occurs. The first approach
is used to measure patent damages, provided that the patentee can prove damages from
infringement and loss of economic interests derived from the patent. This approach may be
considered a confirmation of Paragraph 1, Article 216 of Taiwan’s Civil Code, but is rarely
applied in Taiwanese judicial cases due to the difficulty in proving patent damages or losses,
which are distinguishable from traditional tangible properties.16 The second approach, similar
to the first, is based on the depreciation of patent value, which functions as the calculation of
patent damages. That is the well-known “lost profits” measurement. The legislation intends to
allow the patentee to seek patent damages, as long as the difference between the expected
profits from using the patent without infringement and the real profits made after
infringement could be proven.17 Certainly, this approach should be applied cautiously. To
ignore the appropriate causation of substitution effects on infringing products in the market
would overcompensate the patentee and devastate the interest balance under patent law.18 As
a matter of fact, this approach seems to be stretched from the first interpretation because the
difference of the lost profits mentioned above is accounted for among the various forms of
damages or losses that the first approach covers. But, according to the common interpretation,
the second approach runs independently from the first one in patent damage calculation.19
b. Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 85 of Current Taiwanese Patent Act
Contrary to the approaches above, which are based upon the positive economic value
of a patent, the other two approaches calculate patent damages by measuring the profits made
by the infringer when the patent infringement occurs in the market. The nature of infringing
profits is originally thought of as unjust enrichment from patent infringement. Unlike the first
two approaches, the third and fourth approaches recognize that the sales of infringing
products are open to the public in the markets. This recognition provides the patentee with
other options for overcoming the possible predicament of proving patent damages required by
the first two approaches. In doing so, however, approaches three and four create a risk of
16

To claim damages in accordance with the preceding Article, any of the following options may be
adopted for calculating of the amount of damages: To claim in accordance with Article 216 of the Civil
Code. A patentee may, however, take the balance derived by subtracting the profit earned through the
practice of his/her patent after the existence of infringement from the profit normally expected through the
practice of the same patent as the amount of the damages, provided that no proving method can be
presented to justify the damages; To claim based on the profit earned by the infringer as a result of his/her
infringement act. The entire income derived from the sale of the infringing articles shall be deemed the
infringer's profit, provided that the infringer is unable to produce proof to justify his/her costs or necessary
expenses.
Taiwan Patent Act art. 85, ¶1 (2011) (the official edition of translation, promulgated by Intellectual Property
Office,
Ministry
of
Economic
Affairs,
available
at
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/en/AllInOne_Show.aspx?guid=173f4350-93d4-43c9-a475-042ce0f3ac8c&lang=enus&path=1448) (last updated July 2, 2012)(The authority of the first approach is the first sentence of
Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1, Article 85 of Taiwan Patent Act (“To claim in accordance with Article 216 of the
Civil Code.”).)
17
Id. subdiv. 1 Paragraph 1, Paragraph 1 (“A patentee may, however, take the balance derived by subtracting the
profit earned through the practice of his/her patent after the existence of infringement from the profit normally
expected through the practice of the same patent as the amount of the damages, provided that no proving method
can be presented to justify the damages.”)
18
See MING-YAN SHIEH(謝銘洋), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW(智慧財產權法) 357-58 (2nd ed., Angle
Publishing 2011); Shen, supra note 14, at 14-17.
19
See MING-CHENG TSAI(蔡明誠), STUDIES ON INVENTION PATENT LAW(發明專利法研究) 234-35 (3d.ed.,
National Taiwan University College of Law, Taipei 2000).

confusing patent damages with the remedy for unjust enrichment. The application of the third
approach may be analogous to the disgorging of infringing profits to the patentee, and may
allow the patentee to take infringing profits made by the infringer into the damages scope.20
Certainly, the causation between infringing profits and patent infringement should be
emphasized to avoid the distortion of damages.21
The fourth approach considers the sale revenue of infringing products as patent
damages, provided that the infringer could not prove relevant costs together with the
manufacture and marketing of infringing products.22 The text of Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1
of Article 85 suggests that the fourth approach is designed to supplement the application of
the third as a special provision on the burden of proof.23 In other words, in order to ensure the
patentee’s adequate remedy and to resolve the difficulty in proving aforesaid costs, all that a
patentee should do is to show the court the sale revenue of infringing products, after which
the patent damages are presumed. At the same time, the burden of proof for deducting
relevant costs from revenue is already shifted to the infringer. If the infringer fails to prove
relevant costs, courts use the sale revenue of infringing products to calculate patent damages.
According to Taiwanese academic and practical interpretations, the third and fourth
approaches are applied independently of the other. 24 However, it seems reasonable to
consider the two approaches as being under the same provision. Under the concept of
calculating patent damages from the infringer’s profits, the third and fourth approaches are
substantially positioned as dividing the burden of proof. The former is applied to ascertain the
patentee’s burden in the sale revenue of infringing products, and the fourth focuses on the
proof of relevant costs to the sale revenue and is borne by the infringer.25 The two approaches
should have functioned jointly, rather than separately, in calculating patent damages.
2. Correlation between Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 85
It is worth noting that under the Taiwanese legal system of patent damages, two
significant structural aspects frequently lead to the development of judicial cases and
practical settlement over the issue of patent damages. One aspect concerns the correlation
among the four approaches for patent damages under Paragraph 1 of Article 85 of Taiwan’s
Patent Act. The other aspect is reflected in the legal loopholes of remedies according to the
interpretation of this Article.

20

Supra note 16, subdiv. 2 Paragraph 1 (“To claim based on the profit earned by the infringer as a result of
his/her infringement act.”)
21
See GaoDeng FaYuan TaiZhonng FenYuan 93 ZhiShangGeng 1-1 MinShi PanJue (Taizhong Admin. High
Ct.1993)(臺灣高等法院臺中分院 93 年度智上更(一)字第 1 號民事判決); also see Shen, supra note 14, at 3943 (In respect of academic discussions about this issue). At least one judicial decision in Taiwan recognized that
the profits made by the infringer should be limited to be caused by the uses of the patent. However, how to set
up a rule of causation for the calculation of patent damage under the third approach has not been instructed in
judicial practices. In particular, the infringers used the patent to manufacture the products, which were
distinguished from the patented products in the market.
22
Supra note 16, subdiv. 2 Paragraph 1 (“The entire income derived from the sale of the infringing articles shall
be deemed the infringer's profit, provided that the infringer is unable to produce proof to justify his/her costs or
necessary expenses.”)
23
See supra note 16, ¶1.
24
See TSAI, supra note 19, at 234-35.
25
See Shen, supra note 14, at 10-12 (Although the calculation of patent damages is kept from the basis of the
infringer’s profit under current U.S. patent law, the models adopted under U.S. trademark and copyright laws
strongly suggests such division about proof burden in the infringer’s profits); see also 15 U.S.C.§ 1117(a)
(2008); 17 U.S.C.§ 504(b) (2010).

The most critical issue about the aforesaid correlation in Taiwan is whether the
patentee could select more than one approach to fit infringing situations for the damage
calculation under each single act of patent infringement, provided that no double remedies
exist. For example, under a single act of patent infringement, the infringer manufactured and
sold the patented products without the authorization of the patentee. On the condition that at
least some infringing products resulted in substitution effects in the market while the rest did
not, was the patentee entitled to select the second approach mentioned above to cover the lost
profits caused by the former infringing products, and the third or fourth approach to cover the
infringer’s profits made through the sale of the latter infringing products? A more persuasive
interpretation of the problem above in Taiwan is to read the literal text of Paragraph 1 of
Article 85 of the Taiwanese Patent Act. The beginning of the Article 85 text clearly states
that the patentee can select any approach to calculate patent damages. As a consequence, it
seems unlikely for the patentee to select more than one approach for the calculation of patent
damages, even when a multi-calculation will secure adequate compensation for patent
infringement. To avoid the risk of under-compensation, the accepted consensus in judicial
practice suggests that the patentee may select more than one approach for patent damages in
the judicial proceedings, but the court will make a final ruling and select the most appropriate
approach applied in calculating patent damages for the patentee. 26 But this idea did not
fundamentally change the legal model for Paragraph 1 of Article 85, which merely allows
one approach for the calculation of patent damages.
3. The Gaps for Remedies under Patent Law
a. Patented Products not Available at the Time of Infringement
As mentioned above, the authority of the second approach is the proviso of
Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 85. The text of this provision states that the patentee
may calculate damages as the difference between the profits earned from a patent after
infringement and the anticipated profits made without infringement, provided the patentee
cannot sufficiently prove damages under the rest of Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article
85. Basically, the interpretation of “the profits made through the practice of a patent” is
literally restricted by the precondition that the patentee has been selling the patented products
in the market.27 As a consequence, a gap for remedies opens if the patentee has no plan to sell
patented products in the market at that time when the patent infringement is conducted. In
such a circumstance, it seems that no substitution effects in the market would impact patented
products. The patentee is in no position to assert the proviso of Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1
of Article 85 to calculate patent damages, even though the infringer truly practices the patent
of the infringing products without authorization.
b. Infringing Products not Available at the Time of Infringement
Regardless of the third or fourth approach noted above, and similar to calculating
patent damages under the second approach, a patentee may still encounter a remedies gap.
According to the interpretation of Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 85, the calculation
of patent damages relies upon the infringer’s profits made through the practice of a patent.
26

See the 2009 symposium of intellectual property law, issue No.8 of the civil procedure division, (Sifayuan,
June 22, 2009) (民國 98 年 6 月 22 日司法院 98 年度智慧財產法律座談會提案及研討結果，民事訴訟類第
8 號).
27
See JUNG-REN JENG(鄭中人), THE ANNOTATED TAIWAN PATENT ACT(專利法規釋義), Ch. 2, 170-77 (KaoUne Publishing, Taipei, 2009).

Those profits are usually recognized as ones resulting from the sale of infringing products in
the market. 28 Therefore, the infringer deprives the patentee of calculated damages by
withholding infringing products from the market. One possible way to fill the remedies gap is
to broaden the literal indication of the infringer’s profits earned through the practice of a
patent to cover the occasions under which the infringer did not sell the infringing products in
the market. In this way, concern about the infringer’s profits shifts from the sale of the
infringing products to the benefit of the internal value of a patent. Under this concept, the
royalties avoided by the patent infringer through infringement seem to be within the
infringer’s profits. However, such interpretation substantially risks blurring the boundaries
between damages and the remedy of unjust enrichment under Taiwanese law.
c. Method Patents with a Remote Product
Traditionally, patent law recognizes article patents and method patents as the two
primary patent types. It is worth clarifying that the practice of method patents does not
always lead directly to patented products, which are evaluated meaningfully under patent law.
The exclusive rights under method patents are merely applied against the infringing products
directly manufactured by the practice of patents. 29 Any indirect or remotely infringing
products resulting from the patent’s practice are not within the exclusive rights of the
patentee. Based upon this inference, if the infringer manufactured and sold such indirect or
remotely infringing products to make profits, Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1, Article 85 cannot
be viewed as an appropriate authority to calculate patent damages by considering the
aforesaid profits. The only feasible way to calculate patent damages is to resort to the
manufacture of infringing products. Under method patents, the manufacture of infringing
products may be considered the use of patents, which involves the consumption of internal
values of patents. However, through the overview of traditional Taiwanese patent law system,
especially Paragraph 1 of Article 85, it is difficult to find an authority to calculate damages
just by the evaluation of patent values, other than the sale of patented or infringing products.
Certainly, due to the jurisprudence of the exclusive rights under method patents, the patentee
also faces a predicament in the calculation of damages. The sale of patented products made
indirectly or remotely from the practice of a patent will weaken the justification to seek the
proviso of Subparagraphs 1 and 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 85 as an authority to calculate
damage by considering the substitution effects in the market or the profits enjoyed by the
infringer.
d. Specific Exclusive Rights without Performance in the Market
Among the patentee’s exclusive rights, using the example of article patents, it seems
that the only rights involved in substantive market effects are the rights to exclude others
from selling or importing patented products. Even though the patentee already has a
marketing plan for the patented products, infringement occurs only when the patented
products are made and ready to sell. In this situation, owing to no instant substitution effects
in the market, it is difficult for the patentee to calculate patent damages through the proviso
of Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 85. Similarly, the patentee may not apply
Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 85 to take infringer’s profits as damages when third
28

Id. at 172.
Supra note 1, art. 29 (“A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (b) where the subject
matter of a patent in a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the
process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the
product obtained directly by that process.”) (emphasis added)
29

parties have not sold or imported products that infringe the patent. This is the remedies gap in
view of the violation of exclusive rights.
4. Resolution for Remedy Gaps through Reasonable Royalties
a. First Stage: Judicial Cases’ Approach
As a matter of fact, Taiwanese judicial practices have recognized that remedies gaps
would not only contradict the goals of patent protection and industrial development, but also
fail to comply with the gist of patent law. Despite inadequate authority, courts interpreted
Paragraph 1 of Article 85 in practice to establish the concept of “royalties lost” or
“reasonable royalties” to fill the aforesaid gaps reflected in the calculation of patent damages.
First, one court held that “royalties lost” or “reasonable royalties” is within the scope of
damages under Paragraph 1 of Article 216 of the Taiwanese Civil Code. As a consequence,
when the defendant violated the plaintiff’s exclusive right to “offer to sell” by uploading the
catalogs on a website as advertisements, the plaintiff was entitled to “royalties lost” or
“reasonable royalties” as patent damages, which would have been negotiated and agreed
between the plaintiff and the defendant had the patent infringement not occurred.30 Second, in
order to strengthen the justification for the position of the courts on “royalties lost” or
“reasonable royalties” as patent damages, Paragraph 2 of Article 222 of the Taiwanese Civil
Procedure Act and Paragraph 2 of Article 87 of the Executive Notices of Civil Procedure
were applied as supplemental authority.31 The former emphasizes that the court can consider
all circumstances to rule for patent damages, provided that the plaintiff suffered from
damages that cannot or are difficult to be proven. The latter, which is subordinate to the
former under the legal system, further provides the court with a guideline for taking
“royalties lost” or “reasonable royalties” as the calculation of patent damages.32 Moreover, at
least one court recognized comparative laws from foreign jurisdictions concerning
“reasonable royalties” and other equivalent concepts These approaches, analogous royalties
developed in German judicial practice, reasonable royalties stipulated under Article 284 of
the U.S. Patent Act, and licensing revenues authorized by Paragraph 3, Article 102 of the
Japanese Patent Act, all support the idea of “royalties lost” or “reasonable royalties” for the
calculation of patent damages. 33 Finally, not only did Taiwanese courts recognize the
necessity of “royalties lost” or “reasonable royalties” to resolve present hardship for patent
damages in some occasions, they also contributed opinions about the measurement of
30

See, e.g., Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 99 Nian Du Min Zhuan Shang Geng 1Zi Di 10 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產
法院 99 年度民專上更(一)字第 10 號判決)(focusing on reasonable royalties); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 99
Nian Du Min Zhuan Swu Zi Di 66 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 99 年度民專訴字第 66 號判決) (focusing on
reasonable royalties); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 97 Nian Du Min Zhuan Swu Zi Di 66 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產
法院 97 年度民專訴字第 66 號判決) (focusing on reasonable royalties); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 98 Nian
Du Min Zhuan Shang Yi Geng 1Zi Di 25 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 98 年度民專上易字第 25 號判
決)(focusing on royalties lost); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 99 Nian Du Min Zhuan Swu Zi Di 156 Hao Pan Jue
(智慧財產法院 99 年度民專訴字第 156 號判決) (focusing on royalties lost).
31
See, e.g., Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 97 Nian Du Min Zhuan Swu Zi Di 66 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 97 年
度民專訴字第 66 號判決); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 98 Nian Du Min Zhuan Shang Yi Geng 1Zi Di 25 Hao
Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 98 年度民專上易字第 25 號判決); Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 99 Nian Du Min Zhuan
Swu Zi Di 156 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 99 年度民專訴字第 156 號判決).
32
See Executive Notices of Civil Procedure under Taiwan Civil Procedure Code (辦理民事訴訟事件應行注意
事項) art. 87, ¶2 (Dec. 12, 2009), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/FLAW/FLAWDOC01.aspx?lsid=FL001384&lno=87(accessed May 6, 2012).
33
See Zhi Hui Cai Chan Fa Yuan 97 Nian Du Min Zhuan Swu Zi Di 66 Hao Pan Jue (智慧財產法院 97 年度民
專訴字第 66 號判決).

“royalties lost” or “reasonable royalties.” Those ideas might result from the influence of
comparative laws, and should be given some due review. This article will discuss this issue
later when attempting to establish a harmonized model for the measurement of “royalties
lost” or “reasonable royalties” as patent damages between Taiwan and China.
b. Second Stage: Codification of Authority of Reasonable Royalties
It should be recognized that the momentum from the strong desire for sufficient
remedies was persistent and eventually manifested itself in the amendment of the Taiwanese
Patent Act in 2011. This bill was passed on November 29, 2011. Although the amended
Taiwanese Patent Act will not come into effect until the end of 2012,34 the patent damages
amendment establishes a milestone, under which the approach of “reasonable royalties” is
added to the Taiwanese patent remedy system as an authority for the calculation of patent
damages. Located in Subparagraph 3 of Article 97, the new provision stipulates that the
equivalent of royalties in consideration of the practice of a licensed patent may be used in the
calculation of patent damages. 35 Legislators actually conceived of this “equivalent of
royalties” as “reasonable royalties.”36 The main function of the reasonable royalties approach
is to help patentees evaluate patent damages, especially, when they bear a prohibitive burden
of proof for damages that fell into the remedies gap.37 In view of a systematic analysis, the
approach of reasonable royalties parallels with other approaches as an independent
calculation of damages. Later, this article will give a further examination regarding special
properties about the approach of reasonable royalties.
B. Calculating Patent damages under the Chinese Patent Act
Compared with Taiwanese patent law, Chinese patent law seems flexible for patentees
to calculate damages for remedies. In response to a deficiency over the calculation of patent
damages, the Chinese Patent Act was amended to add Article 60 to authorize the calculation
of patent damages in 2000.38 Under Article 60 of the 2000 Chinese Patent Act, there are three
options for patentees calculating patent damages. The first sentence states that patent
damages may be calculated according to either patentee losses caused by the patent
infringement or infringer profits earned by infringing a patent. The patentee seems free to
select either approach for calculating damages without any explanation. However, when the
patentee runs into difficulty to prove the losses or infringer’s profits, patent damages may be
calculated in accordance with appropriate multiples of licensing royalties.
34

See Intellectual Property Office, Update on Copyright Law and Patent Law (商標法及專利法新制即將上路),
available at http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/News_NewsContent.aspx?NewsID=5698 (last updated Feb. 4, 2012). It
is noted for the readers’ reference that Taiwanese amended Patent Act comes into effects on January 1, 2013.
35
As a matter of fact, except for adding a new authority for the reasonable royalties, the amended Taiwanese
Patent Act did not revise the original provision for patent damages to any significant extent. Subparagraph 1,
Paragraph 1 of Article 85 of the current Patent Act is reorganized as Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of
the, amended Patent Act. Subparagraph 2, by the same logic, is replaced by Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 1 of
Article 97 of the amended Patent Act, but the original second sentence was deleted due to consideration of
overcompensation. The calculation of patent damages through reasonable royalties is authorized under
Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1 of Article 97 of the amended Patent Act.
36
See the Legislative Statement 2(3) of Article 97 of amended Taiwan Patent Act, under the general statement
and synopsis between current and amended Taiwan Patent Act (專利法修正總說明及條文對照表), available at
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/ch/AllInOne_Show.aspx?path=2769&guid=45f2e9ed-6a50-488e-851447a78e3cc320&lang=zh-tw (last updated Nov. 12, 2012).
37
Id.
38
See YIN XIN TIAN(尹新天), INTRODUCTION TO THE PATENT LAW OF CHINA (中国专利法详解) 729 (Zhi Shi
Chan Quan Publishing, Peking, 2011).

In 2008, aside from reorganizing Article 61 into Article 65, Article 65 of the Chinese
Patent Act was substantively amended to respond to the ongoing situation of Chinese patent
litigation in pursuit of sufficient compensation for patent infringement.39 This provision set
up the priority of available options for the calculation of patent damages. The first priority is
to base patent damages on the patentee’s losses caused by the patent infringement.40 Simply
when the losses are hard to determine, the patentee may shift to measuring the profits of the
infringer taking advantage of a patent as patent damages.41 If losses and profits fail as proof
of patent damages, then the patentee will use the third priority, which calculates damages as
appropriate multiples of licensing royalties.42 If the three options noted above all suffer from
insufficient determination, the Chinese People’s Court will award patent damages above
10,000 Yuan, but not in excess of 1,000,000 Yuan, according to its discretion over the factors,
the subject matter of the patent, and the characteristics and extent of infringement.43
In view of the context of Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Act, it seems that there are
no remedies gaps, unlike the Taiwanese Patent Act, even when the patented or infringing
products are not available in the market. The third and fourth options (reasonable royalties
and statutory damages) seem more malleable to deal with those occasions where the
patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits cannot be used as the calculation of patent damages.
II. Functioning for Sufficient Patent Damages: Reasonable Royalties Work with Other
Alternatives
A. Bafflement from Assertion of a Single Patent Infringement
In terms of the development of judicial practice and the patent law amendment,
Taiwan permits the calculation of reasonable royalties as patent damages. Retroactive to 2000
or earlier, Chinese patent law also recognized the concept of reasonable royalties for patent
damages, even though the text of the Chinese Patent Act did not feature of the term
“reasonable royalty” at that time. Under the same concept shared by Taiwanese and Chinese
patent laws, it is worth noting that there are different legal models for assessing reasonable
royalties as damages in the two jurisdictions.
Taiwanese patent law positions the option of calculating patent damages with
reference to reasonable royalties as an independent provision, as mentioned above.
Occasionally, the patent infringement possibly involved damages that could be measured by
patentee’s losses, infringer’s profits, or otherwise. If the patentee eventually selects
reasonable royalties to calculate patent damages, a patentee might not be able to seek other
approaches to help determine the overall damages. Unless the patentee could transcribe the
original calculating basis for the former damages to the reasonable royalty basis, it obviously
contradicts either the legislative structure or literal interpretation of Article 97 of the
Amended Taiwanese Patent Act if the patentee uses Paragraphs 1 and 2 to calculate the
39
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former damages, and simultaneously refers to Paragraph 3 for the latter ones. In a similar
interference, as long as the patentee calculates former patent damages based on the patentee’s
losses or infringer’s profits, it is commensurate to coerce the patentee to abandon the
remedies for the latter damages that otherwise could be calculated through the approach of
reasonable royalties. Injustice against the remedies to patent infringement may emerge from a
stark interpretation of Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act.
Contrary to Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act, Article 65 of the
Chinese Patent Act prioritizes options for the calculation of patent damages. This model,
however, does not guarantee that the patentee could calculate damages based on the
patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits and simultaneously on reasonable royalties or statutory
damages, assuming the infringement satisfied both approaches. No strong evidence available
proves the opposite, though. Injustice in remedies also possibly happens under Chinese patent
law.
B. Two Possible Interpretations for Sufficient Patent Damages
1. Calculation of Damages in Accordance with Each Exclusive Right
In order to resolve the injustice in calculating sufficient patent damages, two
guidelines for interpreting both Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act and Article
65 of the Chinese Patent Act are useful. One guideline is to loosen the application of the two
provisions and focus on the basis of the violation of exclusive rights under the same patent
infringement, as opposed to under a single patent infringement.44 The interpretation affords
advantages by accommodating different occurrences of patent damages resulting from
various violations of exclusive rights. For example, a single patent infringement may involve
the infringer’s use of a patent, as well as the offer or sale of infringing products. When the
infringer violates the patentee’s exclusive right to sell, the patentee may calculate damages
through “lost profits” based on the sale of infringing products that produced the substitution
effect in the market, according to the proviso of Subparagraph 1 of Article 97 in Taiwan or
the first sentence of Paragraph 1, Article 65 in China. In that case, a court might interpret the
sale of infringing products without substitution effects as the violation of the exclusive use
right. Alternatively, if an infringer violates the exclusive sale right, a court may calculate
patent damages based on the infringer’s profits from the infringing products without
determining substitution effects or not. This alternative is in accordance with Subparagraph 2
of Article 97 or the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Article 65.
If an infringer violates the exclusive right to make, offer to sell and use, a court or
patentee may calculate patent damages based on reasonable royalties under Subparagraph 3
of Article 97 or the third sentence in Paragraph 1 of Article 65.
2. Extending the Basis of Reasonable Royalties
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The second guideline works to broaden the scope of the provision governing the
calculation of patent damages through the approach of reasonable royalties. In other words,
reasonable royalties would apply to not only patent damages beyond the patentee’s losses or
infringer’s profits, but also to the damages that originally should have been calculated in
accordance with the patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits.45 This interpretation keeps the
function of the original provision intact, and corresponds appropriately to the text or wording
of each provision. Under Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act, the patentee is
entitled to any of the legal approaches for the calculation of patent damages. Even when the
patentee chooses to calculate damages through reasonable royalties, a patentee may still
incorporate into the scope of reasonable royalties some damages that would otherwise be
calculated based on the patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits. This interpretation has two
benefits. First it ensures that the goal of sufficient compensation can be fulfilled through
reasonable royalties. Second, it ensures the patentee does not abandon the damages remedies
under Subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act when a
patentee selects reasonable royalties to calculate damages. This interpretation’s independence
from other approaches under Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act strongly
justifies a broad interpretation when applying Subparagraph 3 to grant sufficient remedies
against infringement. The same interference, from personal observation, will likely create the
benefits of sufficient remedies through calculation of reasonable royalties under Article 65 of
the Chinese Patent Act.
However, calculating patent damages on the basis of the violation of exclusive rights,
discussed supra, also runs the risk of double compensation. Looking at the example of article
patents, a single patent infringement usually goes through a series of procedures, including
the manufacture, storage, and marketing, as well as the sale of infringing products. Obviously,
the aforesaid infringement involves the violation of at least three exclusive rights. The
manufacture of infringing products without authorization violates the exclusive right to make
the patented article. The storage and marketing possibly violate the exclusive right to “offer
to sell.” The sale of infringing products undoubtedly violates of the exclusive sale right. If the
exclusive right type does not limit patent damage calculation, the patentee may seek
reasonable royalties for an infringer’s violation of the rights to make or offer to sell, and still
be entitled to damages based on the patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits in light of the same
infringing products. 46 In order to function well, to protect against the predicament of
insufficient remedies, and to avoid double compensation, it seems a precondition that a
patentee is merely entitled to having patent damages according to the same infringing
products by selecting one stage under a single patent infringement. But under the same stage,
if the exclusive sale right is not completely violated, non-violated infringing products may
result in the calculation of patent damages as reasonable royalties. In some cases, although
the infringing products are made and advertised without authorization, only some are sold in
the market, while others are still in storage. Alternatively, even if infringing products have
entered the market, only a portion of them causes substitution effects, while another portion
45
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does not. In this situation, without fear of double compensation, the patentee could, first,
calculate patent damages from sold infringing products or products leading to the substitution
effects based on the patentee’s losses or infringer’s profits, and, second, take reasonable
royalties to measure the damages from unsold infringing products in storage or products that
did not cause substitution effects.
Certainly, it is also difficult to broaden the scope of reasonable royalties to cover
other damages that could otherwise be calculated according to patentee losses or infringer
profits. This difficulty is reflected in the issue of how to appropriately transcribe the basis of
the aforesaid damages to reasonable royalties. Further, a derivative issue is whether the
factors and causations considered in the original basis would be considered in the calculation
of reasonable royalties.
In this author’s opinion, the two issues proposed above will not contradict each other.
When they work together, it is helpful to seek remedies to cover patent damages.
III. Determination of Reasonable Royalties for Patent Damages
A. The Property of Reasonable Royalties
Prior to discussing how to assess appropriately reasonable royalties as patent damages,
it is necessary to clarify the characteristics of such royalties under Taiwanese and Chinese
patent law. Compared with the royalties in patent licensing, which are consideration for
granting patent rights, reasonable royalties are fixed as a patent damages remedy.47 While the
former royalties are usually concluded as a price for waiving patent infringement claims
through real negotiations about patent licensing according to the determined scope of patent
practices,48 the latter compensate patent damages based on hypothetical negotiations in terms
of the development of patent infringement.49 Another difference is that reasonable royalties
may be observed at the time of patent infringement to contain what had already been agreed
as a price for granting patent rights had infringement not occurred.50 However, subjecting a
reasonable royalty to the price of patent rights practice under a hypothetical agreement does
not finalize it. The uncertain development of the patent infringement always brings about
unpredictable damages. It is difficult to find a hypothetical license that completely fits the
real situation of the patent infringement.51
Additionally, multiple harms arise when the patent infringement occurs. Besides the
patentee suffering the depreciation of internal patent valuation, the original patent
management is harmed and can further weaken the patentee’s competitive market advantage,
thereby curbing the improvement plan or accumulated innovations. If we also count both the
costs of overcoming uncertainties in calculating reasonable royalties (as compared to
licensing costs from real negotiations) and the interests that the patentee probably lost in the
time gap between the real and hypothetical negotiations, the licensing royalties may well be
substantially different from the reasonable ones.52
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As a consequence, it is rational to infer that licensing royalties as ex ante are not
always equal to reasonable royalties as ex post, even subject to the patent infringement that
may be the converse of the symmetrical patent practice. The reasonable royalties usually go
beyond the licensing royalties.53 The opposite argument will induce the infringer to rely upon
the speculative chance of escaping the remedy of reasonable royalties, rather than negotiate
licensing royalties.54 The inference that reasonable royalties as damages are possibly more
than ex ante licensing royalties can present significant meaning under Taiwanese and Chinese
patent laws. As proposed earlier, this author thought that the interpretations of Subparagraph
3, Article 97 of the Amended Taiwanese Patent Act and Sentence 3, Paragraph 1, Article 65
under the Chinese Patent Act, should follow the way on which the damages that are otherwise
measured according to patentee’ losses or infringer’s profits can be transcribed to the basis of
reasonable royalties for the remedy under a single patent infringement. When the transcribed
damages are counted within the scope of reasonable royalties, the royalty considers the
development of the patent infringement and does not serve merely as fixing the price against
the granting of patent rights.
B. Establishment of the Preliminary Rate for Reasonable Royalties
Neither the Taiwanese Patent Act nor the Chinese Patent Act indicate how the
reasonable royalties should be measured or what factors and causations are necessary to
enable reasonable royalties to function appropriately as patent damages.
As noted above, the reasonable royalties for calculation, which are different from
licensing royalties arrived at through real negotiation, are built on a hypothetical basis. This
basis is subject to the validity of the patent and the existence of infringement, which leads to
the assumption of the patentee and infringer’s intents in establishing a hypothetical price for
damages. The first step in pursuit of such calculation is to determine a preliminary rate of
reasonable royalties, assuming we have not yet added other factors into consideration of
reasonable royalties. The parallel recognition of both the hypothetical conditions of a
licensing agreement and the real development of patent infringement should be conducted in
a due comparative basis In other words, a preliminary rate of reasonable royalties is justified
according to the concept of symmetry, under which the real patent infringement development
could be transferred into a price corresponding to the governance of one or more specific
licensing agreements. Theoretically, the established royalty rate is more efficient than the
hypothetically negotiated one at measuring the reasonable royalties as patent damages. 55
Certainly, in most cases, it is not easy to find an established royalty rate for calculating
damages to precisely cover the real outcome of infringement in one’s own or competitors’
current licensing agreements. Owing to unpredictability of real infringement development,
which is often beyond the pricing of ordinary patent licensing agreements over negotiated
uses of a patent, a hypothetical royalty rate is expected to cover real infringement
development. Generally speaking, the structure of a patent licensing agreement may be
composed of the following sections: the granting license; royalty calculation and reporting;
representations and warranties; transferability of rights and obligations; term and termination;
dispute settlement mechanism, including the issues of applicable law; jurisdiction; and
arbitration. 56 It is an onerous task to reflect real infringement in a hypothetical licensing
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agreement to produce a balanced consideration. Among the stipulations of a patent licensing
agreement, even a hypothetical one, the clauses of the granting license, royalty calculation,
and the term of agreement are susceptible to real infringement development. As patent
validity and infringement are assumed to measure the reasonable royalties as patent damages,
the clauses addressing representations and warranties and the transferability of rights and
obligations fade in the hypothetical negotiations for royalties. The infringer is the only party
liable for patent damages, so no issues of transferability of rights and obligations should
concern the determination of reasonable royalties. 57 In addition, reasonable royalties have
nothing to do with the representations and warranties, since past, current, and future events
related to a patent do not influence the status of patent infringement. 58 As to the dispute
settlement clause, it focuses on the interpretation of the patent licensing agreement based on
the parties’ mutual interest in ensuring that they comply with the agreement to a rational
extent in the real world, rather than the exclusive purpose of resolving patent infringement.59
This clause seems to play no significant role in the determination of reasonable royalties as
patent damages.
The clause actually granting license usually stipulates to the determination of the
scope of the patent as licensing subject matter, and to the limitation of patent practices,
including which patented products may be made, and which exclusive patent rights are
waivable.60 In view of measuring reasonable royalties as patent damages, it is necessary to
connect license granting in the hypothetical negotiations with real patent infringement to seek
an adequate patent licensing agreement under which the royalty rate may be considered or
adjusted as a preliminary one. Patent infringement occurred when the infringer violated at
least one kind of exclusive right under patent law. The kind of exclusive right violated and
the extent of the violation should correspond to the clauses granting license under the
hypothetical agreement. Any current patent agreement that does not grant the exclusive rights
that the patent infringement violated cannot justifiably serve as a basis for the preliminary
royalty rate in calculating reasonable royalties as patent damages. 61 A patent, although
intangible, is legal property, and the practice of a patent is inexhaustible and non-rivalrous.62
In a similar inference, a single infringement never prohibits other infringements, even
over the same subject matter. In other words, the vulnerability of a patent to infringements
always exists, and does not stop after a single infringement. As a consequence, it seems that a
non-exclusive licensing agreement is better than an exclusive one to determine the
preliminary royalty rate for patent damages.63 The calculation of licensing royalties under a
hypothetical basis is also relevant to patent infringement. Selecting a lump sum basis for the
calculation of licensing royalties usually emphasizes the overall prize of practicing the patent
during the specific term. Such a model of calculation works simply and efficiently, but a
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lump sum basis does not reflect the real situation where the patent was used. For example, it
fails to answer what types of patent rights were practiced and to what extent the patent was
reduced to patented products. In order to refine the reasonable royalties so that they
correspond to the development of patent infringement, a running basis seems more
advantageous than a lump sum.64
C. Patent Value and Reasonable Royalties
Next, we distinguish different patent practices prior to infringement to properly
incorporate factors for measuring reasonable royalties as patent damages. As mentioned
above, in order to propose sufficient remedies for patent damages, under both the Taiwanese
and Chinese patent acts, the patentee should have a chance to transcribe patent damages into
the basis for reasonable royalties, which are otherwise calculated subject to patentee’s losses
or infringer’s profits. Faced with necessary and distinguished evaluation and analysis, this
article separates the occasions where seeking patent damages is merely subject to reasonable
royalties, from ones where patent damages may originally be calculated through other
approaches to measure reasonable royalties.
1. Causation of Patented Technologies
First, we concentrate upon the former patent damages as the subject matter. It should
be emphasized that the patent value is never exactly recognized just through the granting of
patent as an absolute and static property. In contrast, the patent value is dynamic, and it is
changeable under patent law. Real patent value must still be determined according to how the
patentee makes best efforts to practice the patent, even though the patent value is bound by its
claims.65 The more the patentee is dedicated to practicing a patent, the more the patent can be
evaluated under patent law.66 Just like two sides of a coin, the evaluation of a patent may be
expected to fix the scope of patent damages when the patent infringement was conducted.
This jurisprudence may be rationalized by the undergirding principle of patent law,
utilitarianism, which originated in U.S. patent law, and has influenced the development of
Taiwanese and Chinese patent laws. Under utilitarianism, the ultimate goal of patent law is
not so much to benefit a specific inventor, as much as to promote substantial development of
industries.67
The legislative goal of utilitarianism might be achieved through a presumed social
contract between the inventor and the government on behalf of the public. 68 While the
government establishes patent law to endow exclusive rights to secure the incentives for
patentees to continue future innovation, the patentee has the obligation to contribute useful
and high-quality inventions to the public. 69 This contribution of such inventions is not
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expected merely to permit the public to enjoy fruitful results of the inventions; rather, it also
leads to further improvements or accumulated innovations of original inventions in the future.
The latter purpose complies deeply with the most significant meaning of utilitarianism. It is
undeniable that patent applications are presumed to reduce inventions to practice. However,
the presumption of reducing invention into practice does not guarantee that the patentee will
diligently practice the patent or authorize others to practice it after the patent is granted. In
order to ensure that the patentee’s acts after the patent was granted would not deviate from
the jurisprudence of utilitarianism, the patent value should be proven through the status of
patent practices. Under the same inference, the scope of patent damages also refers to the real
practice of a patent.
Consequently, when we determine reasonable royalties where patent damages are
incalculable through other approaches, the reasonable royalty rate should be appropriately
adjusted from the aforesaid preliminary rate by comparing the technological advances
covered by the patent to the status of current, similar technologies in the market to ensure the
patent’s real contribution.70 Moreover, the real competition of technologies in the market also
secures the contribution of a patent. This speaks to the issue of causation. To seek the
substitution effects secondary to patented technologies is to recognize if the substitution
effects would happen in the market. The stronger the substitution effects presented in the
market are, the less room there is for the evaluation of patent contribution. As soon as the
substitution effects are fully recognized, patent damages calculated through reasonable
royalties would be limited, at most, to the price of the aforesaid best alternative to the
patent.71
Finally, in rare occasions where the patentee neither practices the patent, nor has any
intention to accept others’ offers for licensing, the value of the patent would not be definitely
proven, owing to the lack of any contribution made by the patentee to the public. If patent
infringement occurs under such circumstances, any remedies through reasonable royalties
seem to contradict the utilitarianism principle of patent law, which is concerned with the
practice of a patent.72
2. Causation of Patented Products
Under the amended Taiwanese Patent Act and current Chinese Patent Act, the
patentee may choose to transcribe patent damages calculated by other approaches into
reasonable royalties to avoid the risk of insufficient remedies resulting from the selection of
approaches for calculating damages. The approaches, regardless of the basis of the patentee’s
losses or infringer’s profits, are scrutinized by the causation of patent damages. The causation
on calculating damages through the determination of the patentee’s losses is usually reflected
in a concept that concerns the lost profits of patented products on the ground due to infringing
products that were put in the market. The causation for this remedy for patent damages looks
to the difference between the originally estimated profits of patented products prior to patent
infringement, and the actual profits after such infringement occurred. The jurisprudence of
the subject matter of patent, novelty, non-obviousness, utility and enablement.
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this kind of calculation for patent damages concentrates upon a reasonable connection
between expected and real profits of patented products. As a matter of fact, effects resulting
from the substitution of infringing products for patented products determine the causation.
Generally speaking, the court would determine the causation by considering the
interchangeability of infringing products over patented products in terms of customer
demands, other legal alternatives to patented products, and the manufacturing capacity of the
patentee for increased patented products, but-for infringement.73 The causation existing in the
calculation of patent damages in light of lost profits should not be ignored, even when the
patentee selected reasonable royalties to calculate patent damages that had been determined
by lost profits.74 Otherwise, an unbridled recognition of infringing products would distort the
calculation of patent damages, and provide the patentee with opportunities to escape from the
lost profits causation limitation when it was transcribed into the reasonable royalty.
D. The Entire Market Value Rule and Reasonable Royalties
As highly diversified professions have continued to develop technologies, any single
invention is possibly a technological improvement or innovation. It is no surprise that even an
end product or an industrial process often attracts the contribution of more than one single
invention or patent. This fact of manufacturing incidentally brought a controversial issue into
the field of patent law. Particularly, this issue is connected with patent damages, which
involves delicate interest consideration under patent law. When patent infringement was not
the infringer’s only purpose in manufacturing the product, it means that the infringing
products were merely elements or components of an end product that the infringer planned to
make. In this circumstance, if the patent infringement is undisputed, it is worth further
investigating what the patentee should rely on to seek patent damages: the value of the patent
that contributed to the end product or the value of the end product? This controversy is also
present under Taiwanese and Chinese patent laws.75 It is possible to consider just the value of
the patent that contributed to the end product. The advantage of this approach is to make sure
that the patentee would not be overcompensated by extending the exclusive right beyond the
limitation of claims without any scrutiny of patentability.76 The disadvantage emerges as to
how the court should separate the patent value from the end product by distinguishing the
patent’s contribution from that of other technologies used in the manufacture of the same
product.77 Additionally, another concern addresses determining the patent value for damages
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and whether the patent value dominates the whole end product. If it does, it seems reasonable
for the patentee to seek the remedy of patent damages against the overall price of the end
product according to the jurisprudence we discussed earlier, which emphasizes measuring the
scope of patent damages by the contribution of a patent made by the patentee.
It is also possible to base damages upon the price of the end product. However, rather
than measuring damages by adopting the value of the patent that contributed to the end
product, patent law questions this approach. While its advantage focuses upon recognizing
the possibility of domination of patent contribution, its disadvantage leads to patent damages
that overcompensate the patentee.
In terms of comparative law, according to the development of U.S. patent law, the
court has in rare occasions allowed the patentee to assess the price of the end product as a
basis of patent damages, even where the patented product merely contributed to the end
product as an element or component. This concept is admitted as the entire market value rule.
There are four possible tests for the entire market value rule. The first rests upon the
dependence of the end product on the patented component. When dependence could be
proven in light of marketing, the price of the end product may serve as the basis of patent
damages.78 U.S. case law also recognizes the unity of function between the patented product
and the end product. The unity of function entitles the patentee to patent damages by referring
to the price of the end product.79 The court found it proper to measure patent damages from
the point of foreseeability and to consider if the price of the end product would serve as the
basis of a remedy.80 Currently, the theory of customer demand works as mainstream to apply
the entire market value rule under U.S. case law.81 As long as customer demand in the market
could be tied with the patented product that attributed to the core value of the end product,
patent damages may be calculated according to the price of the end product.82
Although the legal model of U.S. patent law is not always applicable to Taiwanese or
Chinese patent law, the jurisprudence behind the entire market value rule is not without
merits. This rule resorts to the evaluation of a patent to guide the scope of patent damages, to
the extent that damages are not inappropriately beyond the limitation of claims. The rule of
entire market value, in this author’s opinion, is applicable under Taiwanese or Chinese patent
law, especially under Subparagraph 3, Article 97 of the Taiwanese Patent Act, and Sentence
3, Paragraph 1, Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Act, both of which authorize the calculation
of patent damages through reasonable royalties. 83 Nevertheless, applying this rule
substantively and undoubtedly extends the scope of exclusive rights to outside the claims.
Not only does such extension expose the public to the risk of overcompensating the patentee,
it also weakens the function of public notice of claims. Perhaps, the concept of patent
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evaluation justifies the application of such a rule under patent law, but never cures the defects
resulting from overcompensation and weak public notice. As a consequence, the rule should
function as an exception to calculating patent damages. In other words, the patentee is merely
entitled to calculate patent damages by reasonable royalties based upon the patented product,
rather than the end product, unless the patentee could satisfy the proof of the entire market
value rule.
After reviewing the aforesaid four tests under U.S. patent case law to ensure the
application of the entire market value rule, none of the available tests sufficiently justifies this
rule in terms of patent evaluation. In order to strengthen the justification of this rule, the
jurisprudence under the doctrine of equivalents might be applied from the determination of
patent infringement to the calculation of patent damages. 84 Officially, the doctrine of
equivalents would be applied mutatis mutandis to determine if the entire market value rule
should be applied in calculating patent damages.
This test may be established through a hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the end
product (hereafter “the hypothetical patented product”) is protected under a patent
(hereinafter “the hypothetical patent”), and the original patented product serves merely as an
element or component of the hypothetical patented product. Suppose also that someone,
without any authorization, manufactured the hypothetical infringing product. In such a
situation, the doctrine of equivalents can determine whether making the original patented
product infringed the hypothetical patent. If the answer were affirmative, then the original
patented product would constitute the core value of the hypothetical patent, and other parts of
the hypothetical patented product merely contribute limited and ordinary value to the patent.
By recognizing the substantial role of the original patented product over the evaluation of the
hypothetical patent, it is reasonable to infer that, in patent damages, the entire market value
rule seems to work reasonably. Extending the scope of exclusive rights to include the
patented elements not within the core value of the patent never runs the risk of
overcompensating the patentee. The result of this test entitles the patentee to apply the entire
market value rule to rest upon the end product for patent damages. In this situation, if the
infringer, without authorization, made the infringing product, and used it as a component in
the end-infringing product, then a reasonable royalty could be calculated as patent damages
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according to the end-infringing product, rather than the infringing product serving as a part of
the former.
If the opposite situation occurred, the original patented product would be evaluated
outside of the core value of the hypothetical patent. In this situation, even though someone
infringed the patent by incorporating the infringing product into the end-infringing product as
an element or component, the patentee must merely follow the manufacture of patented
products to calculate reasonable damages through reasonable royalties. Otherwise, the
reasonable royalties under the end-infringing products lead substantially to the inappropriate
extension of exclusive rights over the limitation of patent claims. In practice, the patented
product functions as a part of the end product and does not necessarily have an independent
and distinctive price in the market. When the entire market value rule is inapplicable, it is the
court’s duty to determine the contribution of the patented product to the end product for
having an adequate apportionment from the reasonable royalties that are calculated according
to the price of the end-infringing product.
Conclusion
As the codification of calculation of patent damages by reasonable royalties continues,
the disputes around the authority and properties of reasonable royalties have gradually faded
away. In place of disputes, questions of how to apply reasonable royalties provisions to patent
damages are emerging as a significant issue under Taiwanese and Chinese patent laws.
First, in terms of the legal structure of patent law governing patent damages, the
provision for reasonable royalties under Taiwanese patent law functions independently of
other calculation approaches, whereas Chinese patent law sets the third priority of remedies
for reasonable royalties as damages. In other words, the Taiwanese patentee, in his own
interest judgment, may select reasonable royalties as the calculation of patent damages
without regard for alternatives, but the Chinese patentee must present the hardship of
damages calculation through other approaches prior to selecting the basis of reasonable
royalties. Despite the difference in the legal structures between Taiwanese and Chinese patent
law, it is common for the two systems to regard reasonable royalties as a breakthrough to
resolve the difficulties in proving damages, especially when the patented or infringing
products did not appear in the market at that time of infringement. However, it is ambiguous
whether the patentee could select more than one damages approach in a single instance of
patent infringement, such as using reasonable royalties to deal with damages not in
accordance with the patentee’s losses or the infringer’s profits, and then use other approaches
to measure the damages that can be calculated from the patented or infringing products in the
market. In order to secure sufficient remedies for patent damages, this article proposed that
two possible interpretations of Subparagraph 3, Article 97 of the amended Taiwanese Patent
Act and Sentence 3, Paragraph 1 of Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Act should be followed
to increase the adaptation for various infringement results. The violation of any exclusive
right works as an independent ground to trigger the selection of approaches for calculating
patent damages. Under a single patent infringement, the patentee may select more than one
approach to calculate patent damages based on the violation of various exclusive rights.
Moreover, when the patentee selects reasonable royalties to calculate patent damages, it may
transcribe into those royalties the damages that had otherwise been calculated through other
approaches.

Second, a reasonable royalty is not always equal to a license negotiated absent
infringement. In trying to reflect the real infringement development and avoid the infringer’s
goal of sidestepping liability through unnoticed infringement instead of negotiating a license
prior to infringement, the royalty may even possibly go beyond what is “reasonable,”
provided that the real development of infringement is considered. The wording of Sentence 3,
Paragraph 1 of Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Act suggests this observation. The wording
authorizes courts to apply appropriate multiples of licensing royalties as patent damages.
However, Taiwanese precedent tends to limit reasonable royalties so that such royalties are
not greater than the real profits the infringer enjoyed through the practice of the patent. The
conclusion obviously seems to inadequately distinguish the reasonable royalties from the
negotiated licensing ones, and is worth further consideration.
Moreover, this article emphasized that the hypothetical preliminary rate of royalties
ought to be established subject to the symmetry between the conditions of similar licensing
agreements governing the price for uses of technologies and the real situation of patent
infringement. In this aspect, Taiwanese precedent has followed this way of assessing the rate
of reasonable royalties, but seems to focus more upon seeking similar licensing agreements
than fitting the real situation of patent infringement into consideration. The problem ought to
be fixed by closer observation and analysis of patent infringement. Under the Chinese Patent
Act, including the provision that authorizes the court to take multiples of licensing royalties
as patent damages, its real meaning is not so much to grant a mandatory calculation for patent
damages, as to grant courts the discretion to set up the preliminary rate of reasonable royalties
and refine the rate according to the real development of patent infringement. “Multiples of
licensing royalties,” in fact, is the affirmation of the legislators to consider the real situation
of infringement in assessing the rate of reasonable royalties.
Further, the core of this article proposed that the optimal level at which the
preliminary rate of reasonable royalties is refined is subject to the contribution of the patent
in terms of either the marketing of patented products or the technological evaluation. There
are three conclusions about this concept. The first is that the comparison between the
patented technologies and other alternatives is to secure the substitution effects function as a
significant causation to determine the adequate scope of reasonable royalties. The second is
that when the basis of reasonable royalties is used to cover patent damages otherwise
calculated by other alternatives, the original causation in the market ought to still be
considered in the measure of reasonable royalties. The final conclusion is that patent damages
calculated by reasonable royalties ought to be strictly ascertained, provided that the patentee
intentionally keeps the public from accessing the patented technologies by licensing, and did
not practice the patent to benefit the public. Rarely, according to this author’s observation,
did Taiwanese and Chinese courts have a straightforward discussion over the interrelation
between the contribution of the patent and the scope of damages. In order to calculate
adequate patent damages, it is unavoidable to make patent damages rely upon patent
evaluation. This conclusion meets with the essence of patent law, which secures accumulated
innovation in the continuing technological development.
Finally, this article discussed that the jurisprudence of the entire market value rule
created by U.S. patent case law shows the merit of shedding light on the feasibility of this
rule in determining reasonable royalties. Based on the position that this rule is subject to the
patentee’s burden of proof, this article proposed a test that seeks and transfers the
jurisprudence of the doctrine of equivalents for the sake of ensuring if this rule would
function or not, rather than the importation of traditional tests.

